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Hodges v. Evisea Maritime Co.: 
DUTY TO CORRECT OR WARN 
OF CONDITIONS IN 
LONGSHOREMAN'S ACT 
In Hodges v. Evisea Maritime Co., 801 
F.2d 6781986), the U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the Fourth Circuit has held that under 
the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Com-
pensation Act (the "Act"), 33 U.S.C. 
§ 905(b) (1982), before a shipowner can be 
said to have a duty to correct or warn of a 
condition arising during cargo operations, 
the shipowner must be chargeable both 
with knowledge of the condition and with 
knowledge that despite the danger, the 
stevedore is continuing its operations. 
On July 26, 1977, the MIV Concordia 
Sky, owneq by Evisea, was engaged in 
cargo operations in Virginia when an un-
identified and semiconscious man was dis-
covered in the No.3 tween deck. The man, 
unable to communicate and initially mis-
taken for a stowaway, was eventually taken 
to a hospital. Several days later he was 
identified as Gary Hodges, a longshore-
man who had worked on the Concordia 
Sky during its loading in Baltimore on 
July 25th. 
An investigation was subsequently con-
ducted by Liberty Mutual, the compensa-
tion carrier for the stevedore employing 
Hodges, Robert C. Herd & Co. No eye-
witnesses to Hodges' injury were found. 
Hodges had suffered serious head injuries, 
leading him to claim a retrograde memory 
loss and an inability to recall anything im-
mediately prior to or following his apparent 
accident. Because Liberty Mutual could 
not satisfy its statutory burden to show 
that Hodges' injury was not work related, 
Hodges was awarded disability benefits 
paid by Liberty Mutual pursuant to the 
Act. 
Hodges subsequently sued Evisea and 
the charterer of the Concordia Sky, Con-
cordia Line, alleging that the ship's negli-
gence caused his injuries. Liberty Mutual 
intervened as a plaintiff to protect its inter-
est. A directed verdict was subsequently 
entered in favor of Concordia Line. 
Hodges' theory of negligence turned pri-
marily on his assertion that prior to his in-
juries he was working in the ship's No.2 
hold, that he returned to the previously 
loaded No. 3 hold to obtain additional 
dunnage, and fell through an open hatch 
on the No.3 upper tween deck. Hodges 
claimed that the vessel's owners were neg-
ligent both in leaving the hatch open and 
in failing to provide adequate lighting or 
other safety measures that would have pre-
vented the fall. 
The 1972 amendments to the Act elim-
inated the right oflongshoremen to recover 
from a shipowner for acts caused byunsea-
worthiness, and further limited the right 
to recover to those injuries caused by the 
shipowner's negligence. ld. at 683. Under 
the amendments, the determination of the 
applicable standard of negligence was left 
to the courts. 
In Scindia Steam Navigation Co. v. 
De Los Santos, 451 U.S. 156 (1981), the 
Supreme Court clarified the relative du-
ties of shipowners and stevedores, under 
the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Com-
pensation Act. The Scindia Court con-
cluded: 
Section 905(b) of the LHWCA does 
not impose upon the shipowner a con-
tinuing duty to inspect the cargo oper-
ations once the stevedore has begun 
work. Rather, prior to the commence-
ment of stevedoring operations, the 
shipowner must "at least" exercise 
ordinary care under the circumstances 
to have the ship in such a condition 
that an experienced stevedore, with 
the exercise of reasonable care, can 
carry out its operations. The ship-
owner must warn the stevedore ofhaz-
ards that are or should be known to the 
vessel, if the hazards are not known or 
should be known to the stevedore. The 
vessel is also liable, after the stevedor-
ing work has begun, if it actively in-
volves itself in the cargo operations 
and its negligence causes an injury, or 
if it fails to exercise due care to in-
tervene to protect longshoremen from 
hazards under the active control of the 
vessel during the stevedoring opera-
tion. 
ld. at 166-168. 
The Hodges court determined that there 
was evidence from which the jury could 
conclude that under Scindia, the owner's 
or crew of the vessel had a duty to inter-
vene and exercise their control over the 
No.3 hold to eliminate the dangerous con-
ditions of the open hatch and poor lighting. 
The court also concluded that there was 
sufficient evidence of a breach of this duty 
by the vessel. 
Having held that the jury instructions 
relating to the allocation of duties of care 
with respect to dangerous conditions be-
tween the vessel and stevedore during on-
going stevedoring operations were inade-
quate under Scindia, the Hodges court 
found it necessary to reverse and remand 
the case for a new trial. The sole jury in-
struction given by the trial court address-
ing the relative duties of stevedores and 
shipowners once stevedoring operations are 
under way was the following: "It is not 
contended by the plaintiffs that the ship-
owner had a duty to superintend or oversee 
the operations of the stevedoring company 
or its employees, and the shipowner in fact 
had no such duty under the facts of this 
case." Hodges 801 F.2d at 686. The court 
stated that the evidence required a more 
detailed instruction delineating the limits, 
of the shipowner's duty to intervene dur-
ing cargo operations with respect to the 
dangers posed by the open hatch and unlit 
hold. 
Prior to the Hodges decision, the Fourth 
Circuit had yet to give effect to the 1972 
amendments to the Act. The Hodges court 
adopted the holding of the Supreme Court 
in Scindia with respect to the standard of 
negligence applicable to shipowners under 
the Act. 
This decision places a heavy burden on 
stevedores to avoid injuries caused by ob-
vious hazards. The high standard of care 
now placed on stevedores is apparent from 
the fact that the duty of shipowners exists 
only as a supplement to the duty of steve-
dores in supervising its longshoremen so 
that injuries will not result from obvious 
or warned of defects of the vessel. Thus, 
under the Longshore and Harbor Work-
ers' Compensation Act., 33 U.S.C. § 905 
(1982), the duties of the shipowner are 
now limited, and the primary burden to 
avoid injuries is now placed upon the 
stevedore. 
- Jennifer Crump 
The May Dep't Stores Company 
v. Harryman: "BUSINESS 
PREMISES" UNDER WORKMEN'S 
COMPENSATION EXTENDED 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland in 
May Dep't Stores Co. v. Harryman, 307 
Md. 692, 517 A.2d 71 (1986), has con-
cluded that an employee who was injured 
on an assigned parking lot, while she was 
proceeding directly to her workplace, is 
entitled to an award under the Workers' 
Compensation Act, Md. Ann. Code art. 
101, §§ 15 and 67(6), (the Act). The deci-
sion extends, under certain circumstances, 
to situations where the lot is not directly 
owned by the employer. 
The employee, Muriel Harryman, was 
employed by The May Department Stores 
Company, T/A The Hecht Company 
(Hecht's). The store in question was one of 
many tenants at a county mall, which is 
surrounded by a parking lot. On Novem-
ber 28, 1983, Ms. Harryman parked her 
car in the designated parking area, pur-
suant to a lease agreement between the em-
ployer and the owner of the lot. As she ap-
proached the mall entrance (about two car 
lengths from her vehicle), a person came 
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behind her, grabbed her purse, and in so 
doing, caught it on her coat. Then, in an 
attempt to disentangle the bag and escape, 
the assailant threw Ms. Harryman to the 
pavement. 
Claiming an injury as a result of this in-
cident, Ms. Harryman brought her case 
before the Workers' Compensation Com-
mission. She prevailed, and her employer 
subsequently appealed to the Circuit Court 
for Baltimore County. After summary 
judgment was granted Ms. Harryman, the 
employer turned to the Court of Special 
Appeals of Maryland for relief. It, in turn, 
affirmed the circuit court's decision. On 
certiorari, the court of appeals considered 
the important public issue presented by 
this case. 
Hecht's alleged that because the parking 
lots surrounding the mall were not owned 
by the store, the lots should not be'viewed 
as part of the premises, within the mean-
ing of the Act. The employer urged that 
the court invaded legislative territory by 
extending the statute to include such areas 
and that this intrusion entitled it to a de 
novo circuit court trial. 
The court of appeals initially turned to 
the requirements of the Act that must be 
satisfied to award an injured employee. 
The court noted that the statute speci-
fies an injury must arise out of and in the 
course of the employment and emphasized 
that the statutory definition of "injury" 
includes any purposeful or negligent act 
by a third party against the employee, 
while that employee is in the course of his 
or her employment. The court found sup-
port for this interpretation in Giant Food, 
Inc. v. Gooch, 245 Md. 160,225 A.2d 431 
(1967). There, a compensable injury was 
found when an employee was shot while 
on his employer's parking lot. The court 
was persuaded by the reasoning in Giant 
Food, and agreed that third party actions 
against an employee, while on the premises, 
that result in harm to the employee, are 
within the intentions of the Act. 
Having overcome this threshold point, 
the court proceeded to the question of 
whether the injury was sustained in the 
course of employment. The query in this 
case was confounded by the fact that the 
employee had not begun performance of 
her work duties. But, the ruling in Depart-
ment of Correction v. Harris, 232 Md. 180, 
192 A.2d 479 (1963), was that a compen-
sable injury occurs when the employee is 
"fulfilling those duties or engaged in some-
thing incident thereto." Id. at 184, 192 
A.2d at 481. The court accepted this to 
embrace the period of time when an em-
ployee has arrived at the place of employ-
ment and is preparing to enter the work-
place. 
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The court next addressed the problematic 
issue of the non-employer owned parking 
lot. The court referred to its ruling in Proc-
tor-Silex v. DeBrick, 253 Md. 477, 252 
A.2d 800 (1969), where it noted therein 
the absurdity of allowing recovery when 
the injury is directly on employer-owned 
property, but refusing recovery when the 
injury occurs on the employee's uninter-
rupted path to the workplace, but not on 
the employer's property. The court there 
concluded that "the injuries sustained by 
the plaintiff to have arisen out of and in the 
course of her employment." Id. at 489, 252 
A.2d at 803. The injuries in Proctor-Silex 
occurred on the pedestrian sidewalk abut-
ting the employer's office, as Mrs. DeB rick 
was arriving for work. The court of appeals 
chose, however, not to immediately anal-
ogize this decision to the unique situation 
of mall parking lots, and turned instead to 
1 A. Larson, The Law of Workmen's Com-
pensation, § 15.42 (a) (1985), which states 
that most jurisdictions consider parking 
lots part of the premises, and is not lim-
ited to 
parking lots owned, controlled or main-
tained by the employer. The doctrine 
has been applied when the lot, al-
though not owned by the employer, 
was exclusively used, or used with the 
owner's special permission, or just 
used, by the employees of this em-
ployer. Thus, ... if a shopping center 
parking lot is used by employees of 
businesses located in the center, the 
rule is applicable. 
Id. at 4-87 to 4-10 1. 
Several cases in other jurisdictions have 
followed the reasoning set forth in Larson. 
Particularly germane is the Ohio case of 
Frishkorn v. Flowers, 26 Ohio App.2d 165, 
270 N .E.2d 366 (1971). In overturning the 
traditional holding that the premises must 
be owned or controlled by the employer, 
the court said that this concept was too 
narrow in the special circumstances of 
the shopping center workplace. It further 
noted that 
[T]he employer and the other tenants 
of the [shopping center], having re-
ciprocal rental rights and privileges, 
were also accorded the common use 
and access of the parking area ... for 
the purpose of adequately serving and 
furthering their business interests. It 
follows that the appellant-employee, 
as well as the employees of the other 
tenants, derived their similar rights 
and privileges from the shopping cen-
ter by virtue of a vested privity in the 
objectives of their employers. 
Id. at 168-169, 270 N.E.2d at 369. 
In consideration of the uniqueness of 
this employment situation, the Frishkorn 
court developed a test to assist in establish-
ing the boundaries of the premises. It de-
cided that the statutory definition was 
meant to be dynamic and thus adaptable to 
different circumstances. The meaning of 
the premises must be determined "from 
the logical and close association of the sur-
rounding area to the premises of employ-
ment, together with the peculiar circum-
stances ... " /d. at 169,270 N.E.2d at 369. 
It further elucidated that if a worker sus-
tains an injury resulting from those cir-
cumstances and "while discharging a duty 
to the employer as a necessary incident to 
his work, he is entitled to compensation, 
notwithstanding the fact that the surround-
ing areas are neither owned nor controlled 
by the employer." Id. 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland noted 
that other jurisdictions have held that in-
juries received on parking lots such as the 
one in issue in this case are not compen-
sable. However, the court concluded that 
this interpretation is too narrow, and 
adopted instead the broader construction. 
It viewed this as consistent with its hold-
ing in Proctor-Silex, and as not overstep-
ping its jurisdiction into the legislative 
arena. 
In attempting to define the limits of 
business premises, the holding in May 
Dep't Stores perhaps raises more ques-
tions than it resolves. If an employee, for 
instance, arriving at work and parking in a 
non-employer owned but designated for-
the-employee lot, trips in a pothole and 
sustains an injury, is the employer then 
liable? If so, must he then assume the 
maintenance and upkeep of the lot to shield 
himselffrom such liability? Does this then 
absolve the owner from such responsibility 
as to the employer's employees? Or, may 
the employer proceed against the owner on 
a negligence theory? These and other is-
sues remain to be addressed in a more pre-
cise manner. 
- Margaret E. Swain 
